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ABSTRACT
Who is responsible for the state economy, and does it matter in electing the state chief executive?
Until now, numerous researchers have examined the influence of the economy and other factors
in gubernatorial elections. However, the most recent studies at the state level did not include
economic conditions or found them to be insignificant. This project will examine the thirty-six
gubernatorial elections in 2014 and analyze both national- and state-level economic indicators.
After investigating the economic performance factors in relation to the election results, it
appears that economic conditions did not influence vote choice in the November 2014
gubernatorial elections, a conclusion supported by recent scholars.
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INTRODUCTION
Few factors play as heavily in American elections as finances, on the national, state, and
“pocketbook” levels. From President Hoover’s promise of “a chicken in every pot” to the Bill
Clinton campaign’s oft-repeated reminder that “it’s the economy, stupid,” those running for the
nation’s top seat have consistently pointed to the economy as an important institution (Gomez
and Wilson 2001). In 2014, it was still a significant issue, topping a nation-wide survey by the
Pew Research Center, with 80% of respondents rating “strengthening the nation’s economy” as a
top priority for the president and Congress. “Improving the jobs situation” followed with 74%.
These two issues were at the top of the list in January 2009 and 2013 as well, showing that the
economy continues to be salient with the American populace (Pew Research Center 2014).
The economy is obviously an important foundation in our country, affecting every
person. This paper focuses on economic conditions and the elections of state-level officials,
specifically the governor. Economic factors, including the unemployment rate and personal
income are just some inputs that may or may not influence an electoral outcome. By examining
economic factors in light of referendum voting, this paper will add to the debate of how much the
economy and other factors play a role in voting for governor.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In the last half of the twentieth century, the importance of state government grew along
with its duties. Today, governors are in a stage of “executive leadership,” which is characterized
by greater strength in the party and delivery of services (Harrigan and Nice 2013). The position
of governor grew in prestige as well, now the second-most recognizable politician for most
Americans, following the president. With a growing bureaucracy and budgetary authority, the
governor’s seat is by far the most powerful in state-level politics. Additionally, the elections for
governors have changed over the past fifty years, with most governors serving four-year,
1
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renewable terms and being elected on the off-years of presidential elections (the “midterms”)
(King and Cohen 2001). As responsibilities changed, including increases in governor’s salary
and staff, it should follow that they could also devote more resources to pressing issues (Chubb
1988). However, the states and their governors are still at the whim of larger political forces,
such as the national government and economy. Peltzman (1987) notes that governors oversee a
very open economy without access to a large central bank, thus inhibiting their control of macrolevel outcomes. Later, this paper will explore federalism and who has responsibility for the
economy across the country.
The recent push toward more “entrepreneurial” economic development helps states
nurture existing business through public-private partnerships, investment in research and
development, and broader loan programs. This development counters locational policy which
can create a ‘race to the bottom’ with states lowering standards and taxes to lure companies to
locate there (Hart 2008). Governors across the nation use both strategies to spur growth, create
jobs, and use the information as fodder to get reelected. Whether or not it works is a topic for a
different project. This paper will instead focus on economic performance and how it affects
elections for governor (along with other factors that play a role). If the economy was not an
important factor in state-level elections, what else could explain the election results for the 2014
gubernatorial races?
Current Landscape
It is important to understand which states were involved in the 2014 midterms and the
overall economic picture. In the 2014 elections, 27 (of 37 governors elected in 2010) defended
their seats, New Hampshire’s governor elected in 2012 ran for reelection, eight states had open
seats, and Utah did not have an election in 2014. In the eight open races, four governors were
forced out by term limits, three did not run or retired, and Hawaii’s Abercrombie lost in the
2
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Democratic primary. In the 2014 midterm results, 25 of the 28 incumbents won their race, with
Quinn (D-IL), Corbett (R-PA), and Parnell (R-AK) losing their reelection bids. In the eight open
races, five seats went to the incumbent party (two to Democrats and three to Republicans), with
Arkansas, Maryland, and Massachusetts falling to the challenging party, in all these cases, to
Republicans (CNN 2010; Real Clear Politics 2014).
The economy was on most people’s minds, as indicated by the Pew Research Center’s
poll in January 2014, but what is unclear is how much of a salient issue the national and state
economies was in these three-dozen states with gubernatorial elections. National trends show a
decline in the unemployment rate, from a height of 10.0% in October 2010 to 5.9% in October
2014 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). Disposable personal income is on the upswing, at nearly
$13 trillion for the second quarter of 2014 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014). Finally, the
U.S. stock markets have also done fairly well over the past year, with all three major indexes
posting gains of around 5% (The New York Times 2014). While these trends may indicate a
healthy economy, not all states see the same benefits, leading to a mixed bag of outcomes across
the country. Like all data, “the devil is in the details,” and this paper will explore what these
trends mean for those seeking election and what it takes to win election as one of the country’s
top executives.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic conditions and how they influence national elections are well documented, but
their impact on the state level is less clear (Orth 2001). This literature review will describe those
patterns as well as discuss the existing literature on factors in gubernatorial job performance and
elections. For this paper, elections and job approval/performance will be used, as both measures
express support (or lack thereof) for the sitting governor and/or his or her party (Crew and
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Weiher 1996, 2). As others have noted, the crossroads of the economy and state-level elections is
contested, with studies coming to different conclusions over the past forty years (Harrigan and
Nice 2013; Gomez and Wilson 2001). First, I will highlight the economic factors that play a part
in gubernatorial elections and then explore other variables of interest and theories of voting
behavior.
Economic Conditions
This paper is ultimately trying to determine which factors are important in electing
governors. At the heart of this study is the economy and its importance across different levels of
elections. The importance of the national and state economies in gubernatorial elections is not
consistent, leaving much room for debate.
National Economy as Important
Over the past thirty years, scholars have sought to explain the importance of the national
economy in gubernatorial elections. The findings are explained below. Peltzman (1987) found
national real per capita income (RPCI) significant with positive performance boding well for
candidates of the president’s party (294-295). Similarly, Chubb (1988), Klarner (2012), and
Hummel and Rothschild (2014) also found national RPCI statistically significant in elections.
The other factor often found important is national unemployment. Crew and Weiher (1996)
found national unemployment more influential than state unemployment in Californians’
approval of their governor (5-6). King and Cohen (2005) also found national unemployment to
be important. For every one-point increase in national unemployment, the incumbent governor
lost 4.5 points in popularity, significant at 0.001 (240). Orth (2001) also found expectations of
national unemployment significant, but with a much lower impact (0.03 loss) (419). Another
national economic component, inflation, was much less important compared to RPCI and
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unemployment. King and Cohen found national inflation significant, at 0.05, but with an impact
of only a 0.39 loss in popularity for governors. Finally, Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995) found
personal evaluations of the national economy significant, but with a very small impact (946).
National Economy Not Important
While some scholars found national factors like income growth and unemployment
important in gubernatorial elections, others found these factors statistically insignificant or
unimportant. Two other national economic factors examined were national inflation and
evaluations of the national economy. Incidentally, few authors who discredited the national
economy as a factor in gubernatorial elections examined unemployment and personal income
growth. Peltzman (1987, 296) found inflation insignificant, as did Orth (2001, 419) in her
analysis of the expectations of inflation. In other studies, authors examined survey responses to
evaluations of national economic conditions. Howell and Vanderleeuw (1990) found these
evaluations to have very little impact on the approval of Louisiana’s governor in 1987 (164-165).
Similarly, in Partin’s (1995) analysis of gubernatorial elections in 1990, national economic
evaluations were not significant (87). These results were replicated in Atkeson and Partin (1995,
104) as well as Carsey and Wright (1998, 1001), who examined evaluations in both 1986 and
1990 gubernatorial elections.
These findings, along with those of the previous section, highlight the national economy as a
factor in gubernatorial elections. Some variables, like national unemployment and income
growth, were significant, although their importance differed across studies. Evaluations of the
national economy and inflation were mostly insignificant in people’s choice for governor. These
contradictions show that it is important to know what measures are used in analyses and how
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they impact evaluative outcomes of the state executive. The present analysis will focus on
national unemployment and real per capita income as factors in gubernatorial elections.
State Economy as Important
State-level economic conditions have a long history of impact on gubernatorial elections.
Like the studies that highlighted national economic factors, many scholars note state-level RPCI
and unemployment as important factors in gubernatorial election and approval. Chubb (1988)
notes that while change in state income is significant, it has one-quarter the effect of national
economic factors. On the other hand, Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995) found change in real per
capita income to have a large effect on vote choice in the 1986 gubernatorial elections (946),
while Partin (1995) found similar results for the 1990 races (87). Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998)
found that relative income growth (state income increase compared to national growth) is also
significant, but with a much smaller margin (765-766). Niemi, Bremer, and Heel (1999)
examined numerous state factors including unemployment, inflation, RPCI (and its change over
time), taxes, and debt. The factors with the greatest impact on elections were change in state
unemployment, current RPCI for the state, and inflation.
Another factor in gubernatorial popularity is state-level unemployment. Hansen (1999,
177) as well as King and Cohen (2005, 237-238) observed that relative state unemployment was
significant in gubernatorial approval, as well. Brown (2010) found that survey respondents blame
the president and governor for unemployment on a partisan basis. In 2006, Republicans with a
Democratic governor under President George W. Bush overwhelmingly blamed their governor
for unemployment troubles, while people of both parties in states with a Republican governor
were ambivalent (612-613). As a final note on unemployment, Wright (2012) explains that
unemployment is considered a Democratic issue. He found that an increase of one point in the
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state unemployment rate in the month before the gubernatorial election boosts the Democrat’s
percentage of votes by 0.515 points (695). He finds this true even in “bedrock Republican
counties” (697). Additionally, even if unemployment is rising under a Democratic incumbent
governor, their vote share increases, along with Democratic control in the White House. In the
case of Republicans controlling the White House and governorship, Democrats can expect an
increase of 0.884 points for every one point increase in state unemployment (697-698).
Economic evaluations are also important factors in gubernatorial approval. By examining
surveys in Louisiana, Howell and Vanderleeuw (1990) found evaluations of the state economy as
the second-most important factor in gubernatorial approval (165). Partin (1995), Atkeson and
Partin (1995), and Carsey and Wright (1998a) found that state economic evaluations play a
significant and substantial role in gubernatorial elections. However, Atkeson and Partin found
that these evaluations were only important in incumbent races, with evaluations of the state
economy not significant in open races (104). King (2001) found similar results, with state
economic evaluations being significant in three of seven incumbent races (590). Finally, Orth
(2001) found that evaluations of business conditions within the respondent’s community are
significant in gubernatorial approval for Michigan in nine of thirteen surveys (421-422). Orth
notes that this measure is not ideal, but it does help characterize peoples’ feelings toward the
state economy (418). These results show that the state economy does influence how people view
their governor. Income and unemployment are dominant factors, as are perceptions about the
economy. In addition, Galbraith and Hale found minimal connection between income inequality
in states and the vote for president (2008). This analysis will also include income inequality
within states, as measured by the Gini coefficient, as a factor in gubernatorial elections.
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State Economy Not Important
The final analysis of the economy as a whole comes from studies that found the state
economy unimportant in gubernatorial elections. In contradiction to other literature, Hansen
(1999) and Klarner (2012) found state real per capita income not statistically significant in
gubernatorial elections. Hansen also found that income growth inhibits an incumbent’s approval,
a backwards notion, so she dismisses the factor (178). Klarner found state per capita income
growth not significant when paired with both presidential and gubernatorial party (659). Ebeid
and Rodden (2006) found that state RPCI and state unemployment have “no great impact on
gubernatorial elections” (541-542).
Like Hansen, Crew and Weiher (1996) found that state unemployment is significant, but
in the wrong direction. Looking at Minnesota, an increase in unemployment increases the
governor’s popularity, although it is unclear if this is because of Wright’s (2012) conclusions on
Democratic governors and unemployment (7). For Iowa’s investigation, Crew and Weiher
conclude that evidence on unemployment is “dissatisfying,” with “no practical effect” of
interaction between state unemployment and gubernatorial approval (8). Leyden and Borrelli
(1995) also found state unemployment not statistically significant (283). These findings suggest
that state income change and unemployment are not always significant in electoral outcomes, but
the differences are worthy of further study. For now, it is noteworthy that most scholars found
state economic indicators important in gubernatorial approval. For these reasons, I will include
state unemployment and real per capita income in this analysis. Economic evaluations were
difficult to find, thus they were left out of this paper.
Economic Geography
In addition to factors related to incumbency, partisanship, and economic outcomes, Ebeid
and Rodden (2006) contend that a state’s geographic position and economic history play a part in
8
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how voters treat gubernatorial candidates. They measure this with the primary product index
(PPI), which is the percentage of the state economy that comes from agriculture services,
farming, hunting, and mining. By focusing on the PPI of each state, the authors hypothesize that
the connection between income or unemployment and incumbent support will be strongest in
states with the smaller index value. Therefore, states with the lowest reliance on these often
volatile factors (Rhode Island, for example, at one percent PPI) can point to the real data on
income and unemployment as influencing gubernatorial voting. Like other studies, Ebeid and
Rodden find that economic voting is not universal, but instead conditional, in this case, based on
the economic and production environment. The authors do note that their article does not prove
governors are less accountable in states that rely more on primary products, but that perhaps
voters are more context-dependent when evaluating the incumbent and his or her party. There is
still more work to be done in this area. Economic geography will be analyzed by evaluating each
state’s PPI.
Tax Increases
Another factor in economic voting is the state tax and spending levels. Niemi, Stanley,
and Vogel (1995) find that raising visible taxes (income, sales, and sin taxes) hurt the in-party by
as much as thirteen points compared to states with no tax increases. Additionally, there is an
added effect for the number of taxes raised, which compounds the suspected losses. Governors
who oversaw one tax increase could expect a three-point drop, while approving four increases
cost the governor eleven points. This shows that governors are in fact held accountable for their
tax policies. Tax increases will not be analyzed due to limited literature and time constraints.
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Incumbency
While the link between incumbency and presidential elections is well-documented
(Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002), the trend was not found to be significant in gubernatorial
elections until the mid-1990s. Since then, most evidence points to retrospective voting for
governor, which will also be discussed in the section on referendum voting. Partin (1995) found
that incumbents were heavily boosted by good economic performance, irrespective of party. In
states with a Republican governor, voters who saw the economy as “much better” were 43%
more likely than those who saw the economy as “much worse” to reelect their governor (91).
Atkeson and Partin (1995) found similar results and showed that those with a Republican
governor who saw the economy as “much better” were 87.5% likely to vote for that incumbent in
the 1986 and 1990 elections. Similarly, in states with a Democrat incumbent, voters who saw the
economy as “much better” were only 14% and 19% likely to vote for the Republican challenger
in the 1986 and 1990 elections, respectively (105).
When looking at gubernatorial popularity, King (2001) found that in eleven separate
elections, popularity had a positive and significant effect on candidate preference in both
incumbent and open races. In the seven incumbent races studied, gubernatorial preference was
the largest factor, more so than presidential popularity, state economy evaluations, and party
identification. These findings support a state referendum hypothesis (592-593). Orth (2001)
studied Michigan public opinion data which found that gubernatorial performance ratings take an
incumbent-centered model. Respondents gave good marks to both the governor and president for
positive economic expectations, even though they were of different parties at the time of the
analysis (424). Ebeid and Rodden (2006) found that regardless of all other factors, an incumbent
governor gets a 6% boost in his or her reelection (539).
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The link between state economy and gubernatorial elections is not important in open
races, however. Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995) found that incumbent governors are judged
overwhelmingly by the state economy, while it has no effect on open seats. Instead, these races
have much more to do with the national economy and personal finances (951). Partin (1995)
found similar results in his analysis, with the evaluation of the economy having a low impact on
voters’ probability of voting for the incumbent’s party (91). In King’s (2001) analysis, party
identification was the most important of the four factors, outweighing gubernatorial popularity
(593). Incumbency and positive economic performance are good for governors running for
reelection, but they have little effect on races without an incumbent.
Partisanship
Another factor thought to play a part in gubernatorial elections is the partisanship of both
individuals and the state. Leyden and Borrelli (1995) measured state partisanship as the
percentage of voters who identify with the parties and used the incumbent party in their analysis.
Partin (1995) used ANES data, which asks respondents to qualify their personal ideology on a
seven-point scale. Both studies found partisanship significant and positive, meaning the party
with more individual identifiers should do better at the polls. King (2001) found party
identification significant in nine of twelve elections studied, with the most impact in open races,
meaning that in the absence of an incumbent governor, most voters turn to their personal partisan
predispositions. Finally, Brown (2010) found partisan bias to be a strong indicator of
gubernatorial praise and blame for economic conditions. These studies all find personal
partisanship to be a factor in gubernatorial elections, with people taking their ideological beliefs
to the polls. Therefore, this analysis will include partisanship as measured by the percentage of
Democrats in the state legislature (excluding Nebraska’s non-partisan legislature) (Smith 1997).
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Unified and Divided Government
A few studies found a link between a united or divided state government and the outcome
of gubernatorial elections. Whether or not one party completely controls both legislative
chambers and the governorship could weigh into people’s choice for state executive. Leyden and
Borrelli (1995) found that economic conditions under unified government do make a difference
in electoral outcomes. If unemployment doubles under the watch of unified government, the
incumbent governor can expect nine points less in the polls. Additionally, incumbent governors
who run for reelection with unified control receive 3.5 points less, regardless of economic
factors. These findings show that controlling all of state government can have a detrimental
effect on gubernatorial outcomes.
In their research, Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) find that unified party control is
important only in certain economic circumstances. If state budgets experience surprise cuts in
both revenues and spending, Democrats lose support. On the other hand, unexpected increases
hurt Republicans. This shows that voters expect different outcomes from each party, and reward
or punish accordingly. Finally, Hansen (1999) found unified control to have little impact on
governors’ job performance ratings, contrary to Leyden and Borrelli’s research. These
contradictions show that unified government may be important in limited circumstances.
Referendum Voting
Political scientist V.O. Key (1966) developed the idea of reward-punishment, an
important component of voter theory that is still cited nearly fifty years later. He suggested that
citizens react to past performances by the incumbent presidential administration when voting for
candidates in national office. This phenomenon was also termed referendum voting, where voters
disregard campaign promises and focus on what happened with the president’s party in charge
(Peffley 1984). In the absence of robust data, referendum voting will serve as the model for the
12
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present analysis. In other words, it is expected that states with positive economic outcomes will
be more likely to vote for the incumbent, while poor conditions will lead to the challenging
candidate/party winning election.
Functional Responsibility
Those examining functional responsibility explore the effect of federalism on
gubernatorial elections. As described by Peffley (1984), responsibility refers to which branch of
government caused outcomes and which will fix them. Functional responsibility takes the actual
role of each branch of government into consideration, highlighting the functions of national,
state, and local government. Over time, these functions have been questioned, with different
branches passing responsibility. This is perhaps most visible in the economy, a part of life
important to all. Arceneaux (2006) gives a brief background of functional responsibilities and the
effect on the economy. First, the main idea behind federalism and voting is that voters
understand what the different layers of government do and respond accordingly at the polls.
However, not all policy areas are clear-cut. Therefore, politicians have a greater chance to pass
blame and accept praise in an arena where they have only some leverage (732). Accordingly,
voters are unsure how to punish and/or reward candidates.
Some policy responsibility is clear, like national defense. Since these decisions come
from the national level, voters would be wrong to tie an incumbent mayor to sending soldiers
overseas. Similarly, holding an incumbent president accountable for local street repairs would be
incorrect. However, the topic of the economy is one that is influenced by all levels of
government, leaving voters perhaps confounded as to which level to blame or praise. Some
scholars have attempted to explain responsibility voting, but contention in the literature exists.
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Peltzman (1987) summarizes his findings by saying that voters understand that the
federal government has a dominant effect on their personal incomes, and therefore do not tie
governors to economic outcomes (294, 296). While this finding may have been true in the mid1980s, others would say the state does have an effect on personal income, a conclusion explained
above. However, Peltzman does note that voters respond to the state budget in gubernatorial
elections. By punishing sitting governors (or their party) for growth in the state budget, voters
“correctly” react to the functional responsibility of the governor in state policies. Stein (1990)
takes Peltzman’s findings a step further by concluding that voters hold their governor “neither
responsible nor accountable for the state’s economic conditions” (51). On the other hand, Chubb
(1988) found that state economic conditions and gubernatorial responsibility were significant
factors in electoral outcomes, but they had one-quarter the impact of national economic factors
(149).
Atkeson and Partin (1995) found evaluations of state economic conditions significant in
incumbent gubernatorial races but did not observe the same for national economic evaluations,
directly contradicting Chubb (1988) and Stein (1990). Arceneaux (2006) observed findings like
Brown’s in their effect in gubernatorial elections. He summarizes that most voters can
distinguish between different levels of government and their responsibilities. However, they may
not always vote accordingly, leading to perhaps a partisan bias, observed by Brown (2010).
Brown (2010) takes a different look at functional responsibility and found that
partisanship plays a major factor in whom voters assign blame to for economic problems. Using
the same data as Stein (1990) from 1982 exit polls, which asked respondents who they feel is to
blame for economic problems in the respondent’s state, Brown breaks down the results by party
preference. He finds that Democratic voters in states with a Democratic governor
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overwhelmingly blamed President Reagan for economic problems. Republican respondents split
blame between their Democratic governor and neither the governor nor President Reagan.
Democrats in states with Republican governors split blame between President Reagan and both
the president and their governor, while Republicans overwhelmingly blamed neither office for
economic problems. These results show a partisan divide in economic evaluations on the state
level (609). Brown also found that citizens hold their governor responsible for the economy on a
partisan basis, with Democrats passing blame to President Reagan, as shown above (613).
The effect of functional responsibilities is contested in gubernatorial elections. Most
scholars agree that voters understand who is responsible for the different functions of
government. However, in the somewhat ambiguous control of the economy, voters may pass
blame on the candidate they disagree with politically instead of holding incumbents responsible
on the basis of their office. For these reasons, this paper will include both state and federal
economic variables, as discussed above.
Responsibility
Pollsters consistently ask the question: “Who is responsible for economic conditions in
the nation and states?” with possible answers of the president, congress, governor, state
legislature, business, Wall Street, etc. Political scientists seek to know where citizens look to
praise and blame for economic highs and lows. Peffley (1984) examines what responsibility
means in the governing sense and who people see in those roles. He breaks down economic
responsibility into three categories: causal, moral-legal, and role responsibility. I will explain
each briefly, as they help clarify why people vote in certain ways.
Causal responsibility asks whether a politician’s actions caused, say, an economic
downturn. Did his or her policies directly cause higher unemployment, or was it the effect of
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outside (environmental) forces? Similarly, moral-legal responsibility takes into consideration
how much control the politician has over policies or the economy as a whole. Finally, regardless
of the causes and economic outcomes, a role responsibility model asks how the politician should
fix problems that occur. Underlying all of these models is the fact that people have different
perceptions of how much or how little politicians, including the governor (or senator, president,
individual, etc.) should “take responsibility” for the economy and what that means for elections
at all levels. To summarize, voters can ask three questions when attributing responsibility to the
economy: “did the government cause the problem? does it have control over it? and what roles is
the government expected to play in remedying the situation?” (Peffley 1984).
The idea of responsibility for the economy is borne out through all three levels of the
economy: national, state, and local. Peffley (1984) does not focus on any level in particular, but
this paper will hone in on the governor, his or her attributed responsibility for the economy, and
how behavior has changed over time. It is important to remember that while there is one national
government, there are fifty “laboratories of democracy,” each with its own citizenry and style of
politics (Harrigan and Nice 2013).
Presidential Influence
The relationship between presidential influence and gubernatorial elections was not
studied until the mid-1980s, and since then, most of the research finds that the president’s
policies and party do influence vote choice at the state level. This review will discuss both those
who found presidential approval an important factor in gubernatorial approval and then highlight
other studies that question the president’s true impact.
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President as Influential
Up until 1995, various authors found gubernatorial candidates “guilty by association”
with the sitting president and his party. The earliest findings by Peltzman (1987) directly
connected party affiliation and winning or losing the governorship. In contemporary analysis, by
“holding gubernatorial candidates of the president’s party hostage,” voters can deal a blow to
Democrats if they feel President Obama’s national policies are sending the country in the wrong
direction (1987, 296). Several researchers supported these findings (Chubb 1988; Stein 1990;
and Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991). Chubb found that presidential responsibility for national
economic conditions affect elections more than gubernatorial contributions (1988, 149). Stein
called the 1982 (midterm) gubernatorial elections a “referenda on the president [Reagan] and
Republican economic policies,” noting that voters do not hold their governor responsible for
economic conditions (both state and national), but rather the president and his party (1990, 5051). If voters disapproved of President Reagan’s policies, they were more likely to vote against
the Republican gubernatorial candidate regardless of past performance or current state economic
conditions. Simon, Ostrom, and Marra found that presidential approval significantly affected
elections at all levels (House, Senate, gubernatorial, and state legislature), showing that ties to
the sitting president do matter in state-level races (1991, 1187). Finally, Klarner (2012) found
that gubernatorial candidates of the same party as the president received 6.5 points less on
average.
President as Less Influential
As opposed to the studies mentioned above, three sets of scholars challenge the notion
that the president is always tied to gubernatorial races. Atkeson and Partin studied both senatorial
and gubernatorial elections and found presidential approval not consistently significant in
governor’s races, only turning up in two of six contests, but significant more often in Senatorial
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elections (1995, 103-104). This finding points to concrete examples in which presidential
approval was not significant in electing governors. Based on thirteen opinion surveys in
Michigan, Orth comes to an even more distinct conclusion, finding no evidence of presidencycentered referenda voting. She finds that gubernatorial evaluations are independent of the
president and his party, with voters instead focusing on other factors when deciding who to vote
for, like incumbency and state economic performance (2001, 424). As an example, Michigan’s
governor (Republican John Engler) and Democratic president Bill Clinton were both rewarded
for positive economic performance (424). Further, Ebeid and Rodden find that the president’s
handling of the national economy does not bear heavily on gubernatorial electoral outcomes
(2006, 541).
King and Cohen divide party affiliation and presidential popularity, finding only one
factor significant in gubernatorial popularity. Of eight different national and state factors,
presidential popularity ranks eighth in magnitude while not even reaching statistical significance.
On the other hand, sharing the same party as the president costs candidates dramatically, pointing
to different influences from the same office (2005, 240-241).
Over the past thirty years, scholars have studied the influence of the president on
gubernatorial popularity and elections. Some found the president very influential, while others
did not. More recent authors have tried to explain the discrepancy by noting the differences in
data as well as changes in electoral practices. Partin points out that reforms during the middle of
the twentieth century moved gubernatorial elections to off-years (midterms) so that there would
be less influence from national factors and presidential coattails (1995, 83). Others (Niemi,
Stanley, and Vogel 1995 and Ebeid and Rodden 2006) echo Partin by noting that Peltzman
(1987) and Chubb (1988) gather data from the 1940s to 1980s, a time in which gubernatorial
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elections, duration of term, and term limits changed, leading to less influence from the national
level. It is clear that the influence of the president in gubernatorial races is by no means a
decided issue.
Recent Analysis
Hummel and Rothschild’s (2014) recent analysis designed a model for forecasting
elections at the state level. While using some variables identified by previously mentioned
studies, Hummel and Rothschild rely on a multitude of additional factors. These include whether
the candidate held previous office, such as senator, state legislator, statewide office, and business
executive, among others. They find state income as well as past gubernatorial elections are not
significant in forecasting future results. The authors conclude that state-level economic
conditions do not have a significant effect on gubernatorial elections, a result also discussed by
Klarner (2012).

ARGUMENT, HYPOTHESES, AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Governors’ elections receive plentiful attention, and it is important to understand what
may send the incumbent back to the state capital or open the governor’s mansion to new tenants.
Based on the literature explored, it is clear that economic conditions and their role in voters’
decisions is a contested issue. Numerous authors found that both national unemployment and
income were influential factors in gubernatorial elections (Chubb 1988, Klarner 2012, Orth
2001). Research in this project focused on state-level economic conditions, which were also
found to be significant in voters’ choices for governor (Chubb 1988, Niemi et al 1999, Brown
2010, Wright 2012). Other recent analysis by Klarner (2012) and Hummel and Rothschild
(2014) concluded that there has been less support for the idea that state-level economic factors
influence gubernatorial elections. However, these authors did not include as many state-level
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economic conditions that were found significant by other scholars, including unemployment, the
primary product index, and income inequality. This conflicted literature is the basis for the
research in this project.
The goal of this paper is to examine national- and state-level economic conditions to
determine whether or not they were influential in voters’ choices for governor in the 2014
gubernatorial elections. Economic conditions are those measures that are seen as indicating an
economy’s strength or weakness or a citizen’s ability to get the goods and services he or she
needs to live (Business Dictionary). It is well documented that economic conditions influence
national elections for Senator and President (Atkeson and Partin 1995, Hummel and Rothschild
2014), but their influence on gubernatorial elections is more conflicted. If people are satisfied
with the current status of the economy, they are more likely to vote for incumbents. On the other
hand, if voters are unhappy with present conditions, they are more likely to vote for a
challenging candidate. This system, known as referendum voting, should dictate elections on the
national and state levels (Key 1966, Peffley 1984). This paper explores whether or not
referendum voting on economic performance occurred in the 2014 gubernatorial elections.
Hypotheses
H1:

Improving state economic performance will favor the incumbent governor/party.

H2:

Improving national economic performance will favor the president’s party’s candidates.

H3:

Improving national economic performance will favor the incumbent governor/party.

Research Design
In order to achieve full representation from the 2014 gubernatorial election contests, I
examined all thirty-six governors’ races across the nation. These cases involved a diversity of
incumbent races (28) as well as open seats (eight). This paper analyses national- and state-level
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economic conditions included in recent studies like Klarner (2012) and Hummel and Rothschild
(2014). However, Hummel and Rothschild only used national GDP and the change in state
personal income as their economic factors. It is important to use income because it measures
state residents’ personal pocketbooks. On the other hand, GDP examines the amount of industry
in the state, irrespective of who earns it, which could be vastly different in states like Minnesota
with many iron mines and steel plants whose profits go to executives out of the state.
For personal income, Hummel and Rothschild (2014) focused on the five-quarter
difference from quarter one in the year before the election to quarter one in the year of the
election. Additionally, Klarner (2012) only examined state-level personal income. Both studies
found personal income insignificant. Based on the literature already discussed, it is evident that
the condition of the state-level economy may play a more significant role in deciding governors’
races. For this reason, I will include other economic variables including unemployment,
inequality, and economic geography as well as non-economic variables of interest in this
analysis.
In this paper, following Hummel and Rothschild’s (2014) design, personal income and
unemployment change were examined over the five-quarter period from quarter one in 2013 to
quarter one 2014. These measures are expressed as percentage changes to account for the
variety of incomes and levels of unemployment found across the country. Additionally, the
quarter three 2014 unemployment rate was included as a precise measure of the state of the
economy.
As indicated in the literature review, other economic factors like inequality and
economic geography were found to be significant. Income inequality was measured using the
Gini coefficient, which is a measurement of statistical dispersion representing income
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distribution among a state’s residents. The Gini index ranges from zero, which means all
residents have an equal amount of money, to one, which represents maximum inequality. Ebeid
and Rodden (2006) stated that economic voting was most discernable in states that rely the least
on natural resources (545). For this study, “reliance on natural resources” was measured by the
total percent of industry in each state that came from agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting,
and mining, also known as primary products.
Although state and national economic evaluations were discussed in the literature review
as a way to measure citizens’ perceptions of the economy as they relate to their choice for
governor, such data was difficult to find for this study. 2014 exit polls did not include
evaluations from all states and most often asked respondents how worried they were about the
national economy in the next year. While no doubt producing interesting results, they cannot be
used in analyzing all thirty-six states with gubernatorial elections.
Variables of interest, including incumbency, partisanship, and unified or divided
government were included as potential non-economic factors influencing a voter’s choice. As
indicated by the literature, incumbents receive a boost just for running for reelection (Ebeid and
Rodden 2006) and are often judged on their past performance (Partin 1995). A state’s
partisanship was measured by the percent of Democrats in the state legislature, replicating
Smith (1997). Nebraska’s non-partisan legislature was excluded from this analysis. For those
states with divided control, voters cannot blame one party for economic problems, leaving them
conflicted on how to cast a vote for governor. These three variables were analyzed as they relate
to the 2014 winners.
Data Sources
Data for this paper were gathered from numerous sources. National- and state-level
personal income data came from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, while national
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unemployment was taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. As an important note,
personal income data were indexed to 2009 to take into account yearly inflation. State-level
unemployment, partisanship, and unified government data were gathered from the National
Conference of State Legislatures. The Gini coefficient and primary product information for each
state was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011-2013 American Community Survey.
Records of incumbency and results for 2014 races came from the website Real Clear Politics.
See the codebook in Appendix A for a full list of variables and their sources. Data was analyzed
by SPSS Statistics software. However, due to the low number of cases, I was limited to making
comparisons across states based on their 2014 election results. Future research should include
more election cycles to make regression analysis possible.
With the state as the unit of analysis, the data and results can be generalized to the entire
country. Although this paper studied thirty-six cases in one election cycle, the states examined
cover all regions of the United States and can aid in understanding the economic and election
climate in states without a gubernatorial election in 2014. However, it is also obvious that each
state is unique in its economy and political makeup.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
This paper hypothesized that both national- and state-level economic factors should have
played an important role in how voters evaluated their choice for the 2014 gubernatorial
elections. I begin this section by describing the election results in each state in 2014 and then
discuss economic conditions and their supposed role in the outcome of these elections. The most
apparent finding from the 2014 gubernatorial election results is that incumbents rule the day. Of
the thirty-six races, thirty were won by either the incumbent governor or his/her party. This
leaves only six states that saw a party change in the governors’ seat. Incumbency as a possible
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explanation for these results will be discussed later in this section. Following is a table that
highlights each state’s election result.
Table 1
2014 Gubernatorial Election Winner by Category
Republican
Incumbent
AL, FL, GA, IA,
ID, KS, ME, MI,
NM, NV, OH,
OK, SC, SD,
TN, WI, WY

Democrat
Incumbent
CA, CO,
CT, MN,
NH, NY,
OR, VT

Open Race,
Incumbent Party Winner
AZ (R)
HI (D)
NE (R)
RI (D)
TX (R)

Challenger
AK (to I/D)
IL (to R)
PA (to D)
Open Race, Challenger Winner
AR (to R), MA (to R), MD (to R)

While it is well documented that incumbent candidates are reelected at high numbers
across all levels of government (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002), the 2014 governor’s elections
was no exception. However, did all these incumbents win because the economy was doing well
in the run-up to the 2014 election? For those six states that voted in a different party, was the
economy an essential factor when casting a vote? Based on the literature on referendum voting,
we would expect that states with positive economic performance would reelect their incumbent
governor. This would mean a greater drop in unemployment, a lower unemployment rate, and
higher growth in per capita income. On the other hand, states with poorer conditions in the runup to the election would be expected to elect the challenging candidate. If economic factors do
not appear to make a large difference, we would expect incumbency and partisanship to
influence vote choice. The results from these comparisons are explored in the forthcoming
pages. All data for this project is included in Appendix B. As a note, the incumbents and
incumbent party winners as well as challenger winners will be grouped into two categories so
that they may be compared more easily.
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Unemployment
Two measures of unemployment were studied in this project: the percentage change in
unemployment from quarter one 2013 to quarter one 2014 and the unemployment rate at the
time of the election in quarter three 2014. These two factors on the national and state level were
thought to influence gubernatorial elections. Additionally, it is important to note that according
to Wright’s (2012) findings, states with high or increasing unemployment are more likely to
elect Democrats.
Figure 1

Note: The horizontal line represents the national five-quarter
unemployment change (-12.99%).
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Figure 1 shows the five-quarter change in unemployment. The horizontal line represents
the national average, a 12.99% drop in unemployment over the five-quarter period. As one can
see, there are many states on either side of the national average, including those states where the
challenging party was sent into office. For those states that re-elected their incumbent governor,
the change in unemployment varies considerably, with many states mirroring those who elected
challengers. On one extreme, states like Alaska, Arkansas, and Massachusetts saw a near-zero
change in unemployment during the run-up to the election and then did not re-elect their
governors, an anticipated result given the literature on referendum voting. On the other end,
Pennsylvania had the second-highest drop in unemployment (-23.14%), a sign of a strong
economy, and Maryland was just ahead of the national average.
However, voters in Pennsylvania did not reelect Tom Corbett to a second term.
According to local reporters, Corbett’s loss was expected but not because of an economic
downturn. After troubles related to an education budget battle, pension relief, and involvement
in the Penn State and Jerry Sandusky ordeal, Corbett was left “with little to convince voters that
he deserved another term” (Madonna and Young 2014). In the case of 2014, there appears to be
little relationship between unemployment change and election results.
In addition to unemployment over time, the data on states’ unemployment rates show
that there was a variety of results for quarter three 2014 unemployment. In Figure 2, there is a
large swing in rates, from Nebraska’s 3.6% to Georgia’s 7.9%. Again, the national average
unemployment rate is measured with a horizontal line at 6.1%. While most states who elected a
challenger are above the national average rate, they are below many others who elected an
incumbent. When comparing states in similar regions, Arkansas, a state that elected the
challenging Republican candidate, had an unemployment rate above its neighbor Oklahoma but
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below its other neighbor Tennessee. Like the previous discussion, Pennsylvania has a belowaverage unemployment rate of 5.7%, but for other reasons elected the challenging candidate.

Figure 2

Note: The horizontal line represents the national third
quarter 2014 unemployment rate (6.1%).

These two visuals show that unemployment change and snapshot rates are varied across
states, with little relationship between states with a lower change or higher rate (two negative
perceptions) and electing a challenging candidate. At issue is also Wright’s (2012) conclusion
that voters will choose Democrats in times of high unemployment. As can be seen in Figure 2,
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states like Georgia, Nevada, Michigan, Tennessee, Alabama, and Arizona, re-elected
Republican governors despite having unemployment rates at or above 7%, roughly one point
higher than the national average.
Another way of framing this issue is seeing whether or not Democrats actually do a
better job of bringing down the unemployment rate. In this paper, partisanship by state was
measured by the percent of Democrats in the state legislature at the time of the 2014 elections.
When this variable is interacted with the third quarter 2014 unemployment rate, there is
negligible correlation (0.160), meaning that states with Democrat-majority legislatures seem to
do only marginally better than Republican-majority states at handling unemployment.
These findings suggest that unemployment was not an important factor for voters in the
2014 gubernatorial elections, at least in the overall picture. Many states with low and moderate
change in unemployment and those with a higher-than-average rate at the time of the election
re-elected their incumbent governors while some states that appeared to do better on economic
measures chose to elect challengers. The other predominant economic factor discussed in this
paper is real per capita income change and whether it had any bearing on the 2014 election
results.
Real Per Capita Income
It appears that there is little relationship between unemployment and voters’ choice for
governor, and when examining the potential influence of another economic condition, real per
capita income change, the results were similar. As with unemployment change, RPCI change
was measured from quarter one 2013 to quarter one 2014. Figure 3 displays the relationship
between income change and the election outcomes. Again, the horizontal line represents the
national growth, 0.641%, over the five-quarter period. In this case, we see a large amount of
states with growth rates between 1.0% and 2.5%. One theory as to why the national average line
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appears much lower in this analysis is that the other fourteen states not represented in this study
could have lower income growth but are not displayed on this graph.
However, like the unemployment analysis, there are outliers on both sides of the graph.
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania registered an income growth rate of nearly two points, ahead of
and even with many states who elected incumbents. We would not expect a state with this much
growth in RPCI to elect a challenger (although we have seen that there were other factors at play
in Pennsylvania). However, both Maryland and Arkansas had no income growth, an expected
reason for voters to kick out the incumbent. While the present analysis shows that states with
strong income growth generally reelected their incumbent governors, an expected outcome,
some states buck the trend.
Three states, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Iowa had significant drops in per capita
income, what referendum voting would point to as a prime reason for voters to choose the
challenging candidate/party. However, all three states reelected their incumbents or (in
Nebraska’s case) the incumbent party. All three states deserve a different explanation for this
behavior. South Dakota’s legislature is 78% Republican, and they have had a Democratic
governor for only ten years post-WWII (the most recent was an eight-year span in the 1970s).
Based on this information, South Dakota is unlikely to vote in a Democrat no matter what the
conditions are. However, both Iowa and Nebraska are more bipartisan. Iowa has an almost even
Democrat-Republican split in its legislature, while Nebraska has had twenty-eight years of
Democratic governors post-WWII. We can speculate that these two states simply have an
incumbency advantage, with Branstad (IA) serving as governor from 1983-1999 and again
winning in 2011 and a Republican governor in Nebraska since 1999. Incumbency effect will be
noted later.
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Figure 3

Note: The horizontal line represents the national fivequarter RPCI growth (0.641%).

Economic Geography and Income Inequality
In addition to more-often studied economic factors in elections like unemployment and
income, the relationship between economic geography and income inequality with electoral
outcomes will be explored. Although there is not much literature on these topics, the present
analysis will shed light on their influence. Both factors and their relation to vote choice will be
analyzed independently.
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Economic geography is measured by the primary product index. A states’ PPI is the
amount of industry produced by agriculture, farming, hunting and fishing, and mining. Ebeid
and Rodden (2006) found that as this percentage rose, a governor can shift blame to poor
resource output and rely less on more robust unemployment and income data. The authors note
that state-level economic voting (reliance on unemployment and income) becomes more
common as states rely less on primary products. In 2013, the national average PPI was only
2.0%, showing that most states should not let economic geography influence voting. By
extension, we could expect that states with poorer economic outcomes that reelected their
incumbents may have a higher PPI. This did occur with South Dakota. As noted above, South
Dakota had a drop in their RPCI of 2.2%, nearly three points behind the national average,
although their unemployment rate at the time of the 2014 election was the lowest of the states
examined. Since South Dakota had a PPI of roughly 7%, the drop in income could be outside of
the governor’s control (potentially from poor crop performance), leading voters to give him a
break.
The opposite effect is true for the case of Maryland, which has a PPI of roughly 1%.
Voters in this state, which saw no net change in income and was even with the national averages
on the two unemployment factors, elected the challenging party. With such a low reliance on
natural resources, this moderate performance could not be blamed on one industry’s failure,
leading voters to leave that factor out of their judgement of the governor’s performance,
therefore making the correct decision as far as economic geography is concerned.
As opposed to economic geography, which showed some relationship with economic
voting, income inequality appears to have no relationship with voters’ choices for governor. As
can be seen in Figure 4, the 2013 national Gini index was 0.4772, and most of the states that
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elected challengers or the challenging party were below that mark, meaning they were more
equal. Massachusetts was the only exception. Other states, like New York, had an index of
0.5052, yet they reelected incumbent governor Cuomo. Income inequality may be a measure
that most voters either do not know enough about or see as outside the governor’s control. For
these reasons, income inequality does not play a role in voters’ decisions.
Figure 4

Note: The horizontal line represents the 2013 national
Gini index (0.4772).

32

J. Markon

DISCUSSION
This limited data leads to inconclusive results, but it appears that economic factors had a
limited influence on how voters evaluated gubernatorial candidates in 2014. According to
referendum voting, we would expect voters to judge their sitting governor/party based on
previous results from his or her term. This research hypothesized that economic outcomes
would influence vote choice: reelection for governors with positive outcomes and election of a
new governor in states with poor performance. These hypotheses were not supported by this
analysis. None of the economic comparisons showed a clear pattern of sub-par performance
leading to the replacement of a sitting governor. On the contrary, there were many cases in
which a sitting governor oversaw poor outcomes yet won reelection. However, many of the
comparisons explored above focus solely on the state-level economy.
Many studies also noted that the national economy has an influence on gubernatorial
election results. This paper hypothesized that improving national economic conditions would
favor both incumbent governors/party and governors of the president’s party (Democrats in
2014). The data show that national unemployment and personal income factors display a
strengthening economy over the last two years: unemployment was down nearly 13% from
quarter one 2013 to quarter one 2014 and personal income rose by 0.641 percent over the same
period. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate was 6.1% for the November 2014 election, the
lowest since the summer of 2008 in the run-up to the Great Recession.
These positive national results should have yielded a bump for Democratic candidates
and incumbents. While it is obvious that incumbents did well (with incumbent candidates or
party winning thirty of the thirty-six races), it is difficult to say whether Democrats did as well
because the president oversaw this upswing in the economy. Recall that Democrats won eight
out of nine incumbent races and held on to two of five open races, thereby successfully
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defending ten of fourteen seats. Republicans, on the other hand, only lost two of twenty-two
seats, including Pennsylvania, which most commentators saw as inevitable, and Alaska, which
was won by an Independent/Democrat team. In an election cycle that gave Democrats few
political wins, the effect of a growing national economy under a Democratic president did not
score many extra points.
However, we do not know how people felt about the economy, with perceptions being as
important as the actual outcomes themselves when it comes to judging political figures and their
performance. In addition, many scholars found economic perceptions to be a significant factor
in referenda voting of the governor. Unfortunately, these data were difficult to find, and, when
found, yielded very few cases, which were not representative of the entire state.
Noneconomic Factors
Since it appears that economic factors alone did not have a large influence in the 2014
gubernatorial elections, it is important to understand what impacted voters’ decisions. Other
factors like partisanship, incumbency, and unified or divided government were found in the
literature to make a difference in election outcomes. However, as noted above, many states with
poor economic conditions reelected their incumbent or incumbent party candidate. Keep in mind
that of the thirty-six elections in 2014, thirty were won by the incumbent or incumbent party,
illuminating the strong incumbency effect, which may be heightened by state partisanship, as
noted earlier with states like South Dakota.
For the three states that did elect the challenger candidate over the incumbents, there are
a few similarities. For example, in Illinois and Alaska, the sitting governors came to power
through succession as lieutenant governors and were reelected to one full term before defeat. In
Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett served one term after defeating a term-limited governor. For the
states with open races that switched parties, the sitting governors were term-limited. Therefore,
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in all six states that elected challengers, incumbency was not heavily established, with a
maximum of two terms for the sitting party.
Two other variables of interest were discussed as possible influences on gubernatorial
vote choice: partisanship and unified or divided government. Partisanship in the face of
unemployment was noted in the previous sections and also ties in with incumbency. South
Dakota, a state that has not elected a Democrat as governor since the 1970s, was unlikely to do
so even with a 2.2% drop in per capita income in the year preceding the election. Similarly,
Rhode Island, with nearly 90% Democrats in the state legislature but a 7.7% unemployment rate
in quarter three 2014, was not going to elect a Republican to office. However, there were some
states in the 2014 gubernatorial election that are more bipartisan and elected the challenging
party. Pennsylvania’s legislature is 46% Democrat, and they voted out their Republican
governor. Although it seems like Corbett’s demise was inevitable, perhaps it was easier for him
to lose in a state that elects both Democrats and Republicans fairly evenly. One of the other
states that elected a challenger, Arkansas, has a state legislature with 43% Democrats. With a
moderately low economic performance (near 0% income and unemployment change) under
Democrat governor Beebe, we could expect voters to tip the scales in favor of the challenging
candidate. Arkansas is also a state that, before the 2014 gubernatorial election, had divided
control of their state, a final factor of interest in this analysis.
Of the thirty-six states with gubernatorial elections in 2014, only six had divided control
of the state, where the legislature and governor were controlled by different parties. According
to the theory behind unified or divided state control, in the case of divided control, voters will
have more difficulty pinning blame for economic shortcomings on either the governor of party
A or the legislature of party B. On the other hand, if a state is controlled by one party and voters
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are dissatisfied, they can put all the blame on that one party. In the cases of Maryland and
Illinois, both states were controlled in the legislature and governorship by Democrats. However,
both Democratic governors were replaced with Republicans after mediocre economic
performance; both states had higher unemployment rates than the national average. Because of
the limited number of examples of states with divided government, this variable cannot be
further examined.
After exploring the economic and non-economic factors in the 2014 gubernatorial
elections, the data yielded no definitive patterns. Neither unemployment change nor income
change alone seemed to cause a sitting governor to lose their seat. Likewise, many governors
who oversaw poor economic performance retained their positions. These results show that there
is no silver economic bullet in gubernatorial elections. Although research prior to 2010 found
the economy to play a larger role, recent analysis has found that “state-level economic
conditions do not have a significant effect on the results of gubernatorial elections” (Hummel
and Rothschild 2014, 132). My findings suggest a continuation of this conclusion in the 2014
elections.
At a time where citizens continue to rank “fixing the nation’s economy” as a top priority
(Pew Research Center 2014), they seem to ignore their state economy when evaluating and
voting for governor. These results can have far-reaching implications for gubernatorial
candidates. If candidates know that in most cases voters will not hold them accountable for
economic conditions, governors and state legislators may not have to defend their record.
Additionally, they can take more risks while in office knowing that their economic performance
will not make or break a campaign.
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Conclusion
In 1992, Bill Clinton told voters, “it’s the economy, stupid,” and voters responded by
electing a new party to the presidency. In 2014, voters still believed the economy was an
important issue, but unlike the presidential election in 1992, they did not hold their governors
accountable for economic conditions. The present analysis focused on a myriad of economic
factors thought to contribute to voters’ decisions on who to vote in as governor: unemployment
and per capita income change, income inequality, and economic geography. None of these
factors provided a clear pattern or threshold for voters to kick out the incumbent party in 2014.
Instead, incumbency and partisanship were important factors that often overshadowed economic
performance.
Through this process, I have learned an extensive amount about the makeup of our
country, both the political and economic landscapes. This topic originally piqued my interest as
the midterm campaigns heated up in the summer of 2014. Many media sources and political
commentators perceived an economic downturn in Wisconsin and thought poor performance
could lead to the replacement of Governor Walker. In Minnesota, others noticed positive
changes taking place, although performance in both states was contested (Johnston 2014). When
comparing the states on the variables I analyzed, Wisconsin did better on both unemployment
and per capita income change, but Minnesota had a lower unemployment rate at the time of the
election. Each state has a different economic and electoral setting, and while it is important to
understand the economic and electoral setting in each state, we can only create a limited picture
based on available data.
More robust analysis could be accomplished in future projects using more than thirty-six
cases. For the present research, time constraints prevented exploring previous election cycles
and tax policy to enhance the analysis and run regressions. Furthermore, economic evaluations
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were found to be significant by most scholars who studied them, but adequate data does not
exist to be able to analyze this at the state level. Surveys and exit polls did not encompass the
entire nation, making it difficult to draw conclusions. Finally, time constraints prevented the
inclusion of other data on previous candidate experience and state voting history which could
have further explained why some governors lost and others won.
Based on previous research, this paper hypothesized that national- and state-level
economic conditions, including unemployment and income, would influence gubernatorial
elections. After collecting and analyzing economic and non-economic data, I conclude that there
were no such patterns in the 2014 midterms. Instead, incumbency and partisanship were the
most important factors in the governors’ races. While future work can shed light on the
robustness of these conclusions, political observers can take a lesson from this gubernatorial
tutorial.

38

J. Markon

APPENDIX A – CODEBOOK
State – States with gubernatorial elections in November 2014
Source: Real Clear Politics
2010_Winner – Governor elected in November 2010
Coded: D=Democrat; R=Republican
Source: Real Clear Politics
2010_Party – Party of 2010 gubernatorial winner
Source: Real Clear Politics
No_2014 – Reason why 2010 winner not run in 2014 election
Coded: NR=Not run; TL=Term limit; PL=Primary loss
2014_D – Name of Democrat candidate in 2014 gubernatorial election
Source: Real Clear Politics
2014_R – Name of Republican candidate in 2014 gubernatorial election
Source: Real Clear Politics
2014_Incumb – Did the incumbent run for election in 2014
Coded: 1=Incumbent ran; 0=Otherwise
Source: Real Clear Politics
2014_Winner – Winner of 2014 gubernatorial election
Coded: I=Incumbent; C=Challenger; OI=Open seat, incumbent party; OC=Open seat,
challenging party
Source: Real Clear Politics
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Unif_Div – Was state government all controlled by one party
Coded: 1=unified control; 0=divided control; 9=N/A
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
Unemp_Q1_2013 – State/national unemployment rate in quarter 1 2013
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unemp_Q1_2014 – State/national unemployment rate in quarter 1 2014
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unemp_13_14 – Change in state/national unemployment rate (as a percent) from Q1 2013-Q1
2014.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Rel_Unemp – Change in state unemployment from Q1 2013 to Q1 2014, relative to U.S. change
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
Unemp_Q3_2014 – State/national unemployment rate in quarter 3 2014, at time of the midterms
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Rel_Unemp_Q3_2014 – State unemployment rate in Q3 2014 relative to national average
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
RPCI_Q1_2013 – State/national real per capita income in quarter 1 2013
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
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RPCI_Q1_2014 – State/national real per capita income in quarter 1 2014
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
RPCI_13_14 – Change in state/national RPCI (as a percent) from Q1 2013-Q1 2014.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Rel_RPCI_13_14 – Change in state RPCI from Q1 2013-Q1 2014, relative to U.S. change
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Gini_Index – State income inequality as a comparison of income proportions
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Econ_Geo – Economic geography as the percent of state’s production from primary sources:
agriculture, farming, and mining, aka Primary Product Index.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Leg_D – State partisanship measured by the percept of state legislature that is Democrat.
Coded: -9='N/A'
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
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APPENDIX B – DATA
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